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UK 
This article is based on a paper 
presented at the International 
Conference on Divorce: Causes and 
Consequences held in Beijing in July 
2004 and sponsored by the 
International Society of Family Law 
and the China University of Political 
Science and Law, Beijing. 
 
Reform of French family law and, 
within it, of divorce has been in the 
pipeline since the late 1990s (See 
Françoise Dekeuwer-Defossez, Rénover 
le Droit de La famille, Report to the 
French Minister of Justice, September 
1999, 
http://www.ladocfrancaise.go.../dekeuw
er&fichier.htm; see also Irène Théry, 
Couple, Filiation et Parenté 
Aujourd’hui. Le Droit face aux 
Mutations de la Famille et de la Vie 
Privée (1998, Editions Odile Jacob, La 
Documentation Française, Paris). 
French law of divorce was 
substantially amended in 1975 when the 
Divorce Reform Act nr 75-617 (the 1975 
Act) came into force. By introducing 
in the law divorce by mutual consent, 
the French legislators recognised the 
importance of pluralism of moral, 
philosophical and religious beliefs as 
well as the diversity of family 
situations and experiences. The main 
objective of the 1975 Act was to ‘de-
dramatise’ divorce. While it still is 
a difficult personal experience for 
those involved, the procedures were 
designed to reduce the element of 
conflict inherent to divorce. Those 
innovations were meant to render 
divorce based on fault marginal. For 
that purpose, the 1975 Act created two 
forms of divorce by mutual consent: 
joint request and by acceptance of a 
unilateral request. However, despite 
those innovations and despite the 
inroads made by divorce by joint 
request in the French legal landscape, 
divorce based on fault has not been 
made redundant as predicted in 1975, 
and still forms the basis for nearly 
half the total of divorce cases. 
 There are, of course, other reasons 
for proposing a reform or, less 
radically, an adaptation of the 1975 
Act to the mutations of the French 
society: complexity, length and costs 
of proceedings, resentment of the 
parties, etc. All these reasons would 
justify a re-shaping of the French law 
of divorce. This is precisely the 
object of the recent Act of 26 May 
2004 relating to divorce (the 2004 
Act). This Act was debated and passed 
by the French Parliament within 6 
months following, in accordance with 
art 45 of the French Constitution, a 
declaration of emergency. The purpose 
of this article is to present, analyse 
and assess this Act, against the 
background of the 1975 Act, and its 
likely outcomes, with particular 
emphasis on causes and consequences.  
The French conception of divorce 
There are four possible attitudes 
towards divorce that can translate 
into law, two being: 
 
 a ban on termination of marriage; 
 a unilateral termination of 
marriage (eg repudiation or for 
incompatibility of personalities). 
Between those two extremes, there are 
two moderate attitudes which, while 
recognising the necessity of divorce, 
do not accept divorce based on a 
unilateral decision of one of the 
partners: 
 
 mutual consent; 
 the recognition of divorce as a 
necessity (divorce based on fault) 
or divorce as a remedy to the 
breakdown of the relationship. 
 
Historically, French law of divorce 
has oscillated between those four 
conceptions and went through periods 
of prohibition and recognition of 
divorce, thus reflecting the moral, 
religious and sociological context of 
each historical period. 
 
The law of divorce before 1975 
It was undeniably under the influence 
of the Roman Catholic Church, for 
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which the indissolubility of marriage 
became dogma after the Council of 
Trent in 1563, that divorce was not 
permitted under the Ancien Régime (the 
social and political system of France 
which existed from the end of the 
sixteenth century to the outbreak of 
the French Revolution in 1789). During 
that period of time, the Church had 
enjoyed a complete monopoly over 
legislation and its application in 
matrimonial matters. Canon Law only 
allowed nullity of marriage. 
Dissolution of marriage by nullity was 
more common, however, as there were 
many more causes available for the 
annulment of a marriage under Canon 
law than under Civil law. Furthermore, 
those who found it intolerable to live 
with their spouse could request 
séparation de corps (judicial 
separation of spouses), which allowed 
spouses to live separately without 
terminating their marriage. 
 This dogma was increasingly 
challenged during the eighteenth 
century by the Enlightenment 
philosophers, for whom the citizens’ 
individual freedoms could not be 
restricted in any way by the permanent 
character of marriage. Under their 
influence, the legislators of the 
French Revolution passed the Act of 20 
September 1792 (the 1792 Act) to 
legalise divorce. This was done on the 
same day as that of the adoption of 
the Act that established the principle 
of a civil marriage (however, during 
the French Revolution, a religious 
ceremony was still allowed and could 
take place before the civil one), 
which was regarded then as a simple 
civil contract under the 1791 
Constitution (see R. Szramkiewicz, 
Histoire Du Droit Français De La 
Famille (Dalloz, 1995), at pp 75–80). 
The 1792 Act allowed divorce for a 
wide range of reasons such as mutual 
consent, allegation by one of the 
spouses of incompatibility of 
personalities and other specific legal 
causes (eg dementia, criminal 
conviction, serious insult, desertion 
of the spouse for at least 2 years, 
etc). At the same time, and probably 
as a reaction to its religious 
origins, judicial separation was 
viewed as unnecessary and abolished by 
the 1792 Act. Following the passing of 
this Act, the number of divorce cases 
significantly increased during the 
Revolution. Early figures showed that 
trend, notably in Paris where, over a 
12-year period 13,000 divorces out of 
55,000 marriages (24%) were granted          
(see Szramkiewicz, op cit, at p 80). 
 Under the Code Napoléon, the French 
Civil Code of 1804 (the Civil Code), 
as a result of the secularisation of 
marriage, the principle of divorce was 
maintained but the principle of 
indissolubility of marriage was also 
re-established, derogations from which 
were limited. The grounds for divorce 
were therefore fewer than under the 
Revolution period: divorce could be 
granted either on the ground of fault 
or by mutual consent, in which case 
the requirements were less lenient 
than under the Revolution period (See 
V.D. Roughol-Valderon, ‘Le Divorce par 
Consentement Mutuel et le Code 
Napoléon’ [1975] Revue Trimestrielle 
de Droit Civil 482). Furthermore, the 
procedure for divorce by mutual 
consent was longer and subject to 
dissuasive requirements (for example, 
even adult couples had to obtain the 
consent of their parents and had to 
give up half of their property to 
their children). In this context, 
judicial separation re-introduced by 
the Civil Code became a more 
convenient alternative to divorce, 
especially for those who were no 
longer willing to live with their 
spouse but whose religious or moral 
convictions went against the idea of 
divorce. As a result, the number of 
divorce petitions dropped 
dramatically.  
 The rules set out under the Civil 
Code were applied for just a decade. 
Under the Restauration period (from 
1815 to 1848, the monarchy was 
restored under the reigns of Louis 
XVIII, Charles X and Louis-Philippe 
I), Catholicism was again declared the 
official religion of the State and 
divorce was abolished by the Bonald 
Act of 8 May 1816. In compliance with 
Canon law, judicial separation was 
maintained.  
 As it was of a political nature, 
this law was at the mercy of any 
political change but, surprisingly 
enough, the prohibition of divorce 
survived the various political regimes 
that followed the fall of the Monarchy 
in 1848. The principle of 
indissolubility of marriage remained 
unchallenged under the Second Republic 
(1848–1851), the Second Empire  
(1851–1871) and during the first 
10 years of the Third Republic.  
 It was in the anti-clerical 
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atmosphere of the early years of the 
Third Republic that Alfred Naquet, law 
professor and MP, drafted a number of 
private bills in favour of the 
legalisation of divorce. The third 
bill finally led to the adoption of 
the Act of 27 July 1884 (the 1884 
Act). Following a passionate debate, 
at a time when State and Church were 
not yet separated, the 1884 Act 
legalised only one form of divorce, 
that which is based on fault. Divorce 
by mutual consent or by unilateral 
decision were no longer part of French 
positive law. Divorce was then 
regarded as a sanction either against 
the spouse who had rendered married 
life intolerable or against both 
spouses, in which case a divorce 
decree was granted on the basis of 
torts réciproques or torts partagés 
(shared fault/responsibility).  
 The 1884 Act and its subsequent 
amendments (the Act of 18 April 1886 
which simplified the divorce 
procedure; the Act of 15 December 
1904, which allowed the adultery 
spouse to marry the person with whom 
he had an affair; and the Act of 6 
June 1908, which allowed the 
conversion by court order of judicial 
separation into divorce even in the 
case of the request being made by the 
‘guilty’ spouse) resulted in a steady 
increase of divorce to the point that 
it alarmed conservative people: the 
number of divorce cases jumped from 
3,000 in 1885 to 13,000 in 1910, 
15,000 in 1913, 20,000 in 1926, 21,000 
in 1931, 23,000 in 1936 and reached 
24,000 in 1939. The Far Right Vichy 
Government attempted to curb this 
trend by passing the Act of 2 April 
1941, which barred divorce petitions 
within the first 3 years of marriage, 
made the procedure much longer and 
defined the causes of divorce more 
restrictively. After the war, this Act 
was not repealed but emptied of its 
substance and the number of divorce 
cases kept growing from 30,000 in 1953 
to 53,000 in 1974.  
 
The reform of 1975 
From 1884 to 1975, only one cause of 
divorce was officially recognised in 
French law: fault. The 1975 Act 
dramatically changed the French 
conception of divorce. Fault as a 
cause was not abolished (see arts 229 
and 242 of the Civil Code) but the 
1975 Act introduced three more causes:  
 
(1) consentement mutual: mutual 
consent by joint request of both 
spouses (see art 231 of the Civil 
Code);  
(2) divorce demandé par un époux et 
accepté par l’autre: mutual 
consent by unilateral request 
accepted by the respondent, also 
known in French as ‘double aveu’ 
or ‘aveu indivisible’(see former 
art 233 of the Civil Code); and  
(3) rupture de vie commune: breakdown 
of the relationship/common life 
(Article 237 of the Civil Code 
enabled one of the parties to 
petition for divorce after they 
had lived apart for at least 6 
years, or under art 238, where the 
respondent’s mental health had 
seriously deteriorated over a 
period of 6 years so as to render 
‘common life’ intolerable). 
 
Under the 1975 Act, French law of 
divorce was mainly characterised by 
its pluralism – which was a response 
to the diversity of matrimonial crises 
– in sharp contrast with the 
monolithic approach that predominated 
until then. 
 
Assessment of the 1975 reform on 
divorce 
The reasons for the 1975 reform  
Until 1975, the various changes in the 
law of divorce were based on political 
conceptions. The 1975 reform was the 
result of the imperfections and 
weaknesses of the framework set out in 
the 1884 Act and of sociological 
changes in France.  
 Fault as the sole cause of divorce 
under the 1884 regime had a dual 
drawback: 
 
 on the one hand, it led to the 
antagonism between the spouses 
being excerbated as the ‘innocent’ 
spouse could make substantial gains 
such as pension alimentaire 
(maintenance/alimonies), dommages 
et intérêts (compensatory 
payments), care/custody of the 
child(ren), and the keeping of the 
benefits of married life; the post-
divorce period was made even more 
difficult as a result; and 
 on the other hand, those wishing to 
divorce amicably by mutual consent 
had no alternative but to resort to 
faking a divorce based on fault.  
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The 1975 reform was also the 
consequence of a change of mentality 
and social behaviour which appeared in 
the 1960s: greater permissiveness of 
morals and social behaviour was 
increasingly tolerated; individual 
happiness became a supreme value; and 
more and more women starting a 
professional activity. In this context 
of social change, the traditional 
conception of family was shattered and 
marriage was then perceived as an 
obstacle to individual happiness and 
development. 
 The 1884 Act no longer met the needs 
of a changing French society. The law 
was no longer in synchronisation with 
social reality. The growing dichotomy 
between the law and social reality was 
made even more acute by a major 
opinion poll conducted in the early 
1970s (See Le Divorce et les 
Français : Vol 1, Enquête d’opinion 
(PUF, 1974); Vol 2 : L’Expérience des 
Divorcés (PUF, 1975)). The majority of 
those questioned in that poll were in 
favour of a reform on three major 
aspects of divorce: a widening of the 
causes of divorce (but the French 
remained attached to the idea of a 
fault-based divorce); a 
‘de-dramatisation’ of the divorce 
procedure; and a less conflicting 
post-divorce period. A reform was then 
justified. 
 Based on the results of this opinion 
poll and on reforms that had already 
taken place in various European 
countries, a first draft was drawn up 
in 1973 by Professor J Carbonnier at 
the request of the Ministry of Justice 
and opened to public consultation. The 
Bill, approved by the French Conseil 
d’Etat (the highest administrative 
court) and the government,was passed 
by the French Parliament on 11 July 
1975 along the main lines of the 
Carbonnier draft. The Divorce Reform 
Act nr 75-617 came into force and was 
incorporated into the Civil Code on 1 
January 1976, amending arts 229–310 of 
the Code (Amongst the many 
commentaries, see J. Carbonnier, La 
Question du Divorce – Mémoire à 
consulter, (1975) Dalloz, Chron at p 
115; P. Raynaud, Les Divers Visages du 
Divorce, (1976) Dalloz, Chron at p 
141); J.-Cl. Groslière, La Réforme du 
Divorce (Dalloz, 1976); R. Lindon and 
A. Bénabent, Le Divorce en France 
(Litec, 1984)). 
 
The objectives and principles of 
the 1975 Act 
The reform of 11 July 1975 was 
articulated around three major 
principles, which were revealed by the 
opinion poll. The first key principle 
was to open up the institution of 
divorce by creating and recognising 
new causes of divorce. While fault-
based divorce was maintained (the 
principle that any harm caused by 
someone’s fault must be redressed is a 
constitutional principle; see Cons 
Const, Decision 99–419, DC, 9 November 
1999, OJFR 16.11.1999, at p 16962), 
mutual consent was re-introduced in 
the law and breakdown of the 
relationship as a ground was newly 
created. 
 The second key element of the reform 
was an attempt to ‘de-dramatise’ the 
whole divorce procedure. The original 
intention was to prevent divorce 
proceedings from intensifying the 
tension between the two spouses. To 
that end, divorce petitions would be 
dealt with by a specialised judge, the 
juge aux affaires matrimoniales (judge 
for matrimonial matters. Originally, 
this judge would have exclusive 
competence to grant divorce by mutual 
consent and would act only as a 
conciliatory judge during the first 
stage of other divorce cases. He would 
also deal with any litigation arising 
after the divorce decree was granted. 
Furthermore, with the view to 
pacifying the whole divorce process, 
pactes amiables (amicable settlements) 
covering the issue of children, the 
name of the wife after the divorce and 
jointly-owned property were also 
encouraged under the 1975 Act on the 
principle that a settlement agreed by 
the spouses had more chance of being 
complied with than any solution 
imposed by the court. The purpose of 
the 1975 Act was to bring about closer 
cooperation between the litigants and 
the courts, the role of this 
specialised judge being not only to 
make judicial decisions but also to 
help the spouses find an agreement. )( 
The juge aux affaires matrimoniales 
became the juge des affaires 
familiales (family judge) under the 
Act of 8 January 1993, which increased 
the judge’s powers by ensuring that  
the whole divorce procedure takes 
place before him, notably its second 
phase at the end of which the divorce 
decree is pronounced. 
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 Finally, in order to limit the 
possibility of litigation after 
divorce, the 1975 Act provided that a 
complete divorce settlement had to be 
concluded by the time the divorce 
decree was granted by the court. The 
Act provided that, in principle, 
prestations compensatoires 
(ancillary/financial relief) should 
take the form of payment of a capital 
sum and, where resources did not allow 
it, of payment of an allowance. The 
Act nr 2000-596 of 30 June 2000 on 
prestations compensatoires in divorce 
cases was passed in order to mitigate 
the severity of lump sum payments by 
authorising the payment of the capital 
sum over a period of 8 years and, in 
exceptional cases by reason of the 
health or age of the creditor, by way 
of a rente viagère (life annuity). 
 
Critical assessment of the 1975 
reform 
In 1999, in her report to the 
government, Françoise Dekeuwer-
Défossez put the question as to the 
relevance and the timeliness of 
reforming a law that had been in force 
for only 25 years, and as to whether 
only some of its provisions, such as 
those on ancillary relief (as was the 
case in 2000), should simply be 
polished up (Rénover le Droit de La 
famille, op. cit. at p 73). However, 
she further stated that such 
alternative was insupportable as: 
 
‘the expectation of reform … [was] 
great, amongst both the general 
public and lawyers practising in 
that field. The general view [was] 
that the law of 1975 [had] only 
partially met the expectations that 
it raised, that there [was] a gap 
between the law and the present 
state of society, and that it (was) 
only with great difficulties that 
it (was) applied properly by the 
courts.’ (ibid, at p 73 
(translation by this author)). 
 
The number of divorce cases has 
increased dramatically over 40 years. 
From 30,000 in 1960, it reached 39,000 
in 1970 and 60,000 in 1976. It further 
jumped to 81,000 in 1980 and 100,000 
in 1985 to finally peak at 120,000 in 
1995 and stabilise at around 115,000 
cases per year on average. In 1970, 
for every 100 marriages, 11.3 divorce 
decrees were granted. This figure 
jumped to 38 in 2001. This increase in 
divorce cases may be explained by a 
variety of reasons but it is 
undeniable that the liberalisation of 
divorce under the 1975 Act has played 
a major role. However, although 
statistical data show that some of the 
objectives of the 1975 Act were met, 
the overall assessment of the divorce 
regime can only be negative on three 
counts: causes, procedure and 
consequences. 
 With respect to causes, although it 
is undeniable that the introduction of 
mutual consent as a ground for divorce 
was a major step forward, it is also 
true to say that this was no longer 
satisfactory as the needs of those who 
wished to divorce without having to 
rely on the respondent’s accord or 
fault were not addressed. The issue of 
a need for a ground for divorce is 
even raised by some academics since 
the idea of cause reflects a logic of 
indissolubility of marriage (see A. 
Bénabent, who also believes that it 
might be time to legalise a ‘divorce 
by persistent unilateral request’, 
Droit Civil de la Famille (10th edn, 
Litec, 2001), at p 138)). Under the 
1975 Act, divorce based on fault 
should have been marginalised. 
However, reality shows that, although 
the important proportion of divorce by 
mutual consent is a direct consequence 
of the legislators’ attempt to ‘de-
dramatise’ the procedure and give 
spouses more responsible choice, 
divorce by joint request and by 
unilateral request accepted by the 
respondent peaked to 40 and 13% of 
divorce cases respectively. Divorce 
following the breakdown of the 
relationship and de facto separation 
remained very marginal, representing 
only 2% of all divorce cases. This 
clearly means that 45% of divorce 
petitions are still based on fault. As 
Dekeuwer-Défossez pointed out: 
 
‘[m]anifestly, the Act of 1975 
failed to eradicate the temptation 
[for the parties] to blame the 
other in order to obtain some 
financial or moral benefit, or to 
offer a satisfactory solution to 
those who have agreed on the 
principle of separation but cannot 
reach a general agreement on its 
details.’ (op cit, at p 73 
(translation by this author)). 
 
The necessity to keep fault as a 
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ground for divorce is called into 
question as it is often futile to 
designate one of the parties as the 
‘guilty’ one during long and 
exhaustive proceedings that feed on 
hatred and resentment (see the views 
and arguments of a family judge on 
this issue: Ganancia, ‘Pour un Divorce 
du XXIème siècle’ (1997) Gaz Pal Doctr 
662). 
 Furthermore, the practice of divorce 
petitions based on faked fault, either 
for procedural expediency or for 
questionable financial interests, did 
not disappear (the reasons for such 
misuse of divorce proceedings are 
clearly dealt with in P. Gélard, 
Report on the Divorce Bill, Report 
nr 120 written on behalf of the Senate 
Committee for Constitutional laws, 
Legislation and universal Suffrage, 
Parliamentary Session 2003-2004,  
at 18–19 (available at: 
http://www.senat.fr/rap/l03-120/l03-
120_mono.html)). With respect to 
divorce resulting from the breakdown 
of the relationship, the 1975 Act 
surrounded the procedure by so many 
financial and moral safeguards in 
favour of the respondent (the 
objective was to avert the possibility 
of repudiation of a spouse by the 
other who wished to start a new life 
with a younger partner) that it 
rendered this form of divorce 
inefficient. As a result, in France, 
unlike in many other countries, 
divorce proceedings are rarely 
initiated on that ground (see 
Dekeuwer-Défossez, op cit, at pp 73-
74 ; see also P. Delnatte, Report on 
Divorce Bill nr 1338 as adopted by the 
Senate, Report nr 1513 on behalf of 
the National Assembly Committee for 
Constitutional laws, Legislation and 
General Administration of the 
Republic, at p 12,available at: 
http://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/12/rapports/ 
r1513.asp). 
 With respect to procedure, it is 
undisputable that, as a result of its 
relaxation under the 1975 Act, the 
number of ‘amicable’ divorce cases 
considerably increased (see J. Rozier. 
Information Report on the Divorce Bill 
nr 389, Senate Parliamentary Session 
2003-2004, report nr 117, at p 18, 
available at: 
http://www.senat.fr/rap/r03-117/r03-
117_mono.html). However, in the case 
of divorce other than by mutual 
consent, the procedure itself played a 
role in aggravating tensions between 
the parties (see P. Gélard’s report, 
op cit, at pp 19–20). For instance, in 
divorce based on fault, the 
proceedings are too often used by the 
parties as a slanging match and, in 
divorce by mutual consent based on a 
unilateral request, the petitioner 
must give evidence in court that life 
with the respondent has become 
intolerable and the respondent must 
recognised that this is the case. 
The proceedings tend to be too long 
also (ibid,at 20–21). In 2001, the 
average length of divorce proceedings 
was 12.8 months; a divorce decree is 
granted 9.2 months after a joint 
request is made but after 18 months on 
average in fault-based divorce cases 
(see Ministère de la Justice, Annuaire 
Statistique de la Justice 
(Documentation Française, 2003)). The 
average length of divorce proceedings 
based on fault is severely criticised 
as this could lead to aggravating the 
accusations made by each party against 
the other, thus poisoning their 
negotiations.  
Equally, proceedings are too 
formalistic. For example, in joint 
request proceedings, the spouses still 
have an obligation to attend two court 
hearings, separated by a compulsory 3-
month period of reflection, even in 
cases where there is no application 
for custody of the children or for 
financial relief. Such requirement has 
been unanimously criticised for being 
superfluous and a source of 
complications for couples who may have 
lived separately for years and have 
started a new life after separation. 
Equally, in divorce proceedings based 
on a unilateral request accepted by 
the respondent, the parties are 
required to exchange written 
submissions. Furthermore, the length 
of the initial stage of the 
proceedings tends to delay the 
adoption by the court of necessary 
interim measures.  
Finally, and most importantly, the 
1975 Act does not provide many 
pathways between the various divorce 
procedures and the possibility for the 
parties to switch procedure is 
therefore too restricted. Article 246 
of the Civil Code made it certainly 
possible for the parties who had 
initiated divorce proceedings on the 
ground of the breakdown of the 
relationship to ask the court, at a 
later stage, to grant a divorce decree 
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on the ground of mutual consent. 
However, new divorce proceedings have 
to be initiated on this new ground. 
Furthermore, such alternative is open 
at the conciliatory stage of the 
original proceedings only, before the 
court has made a decision on the 
merits. Moreover, it is not possible 
to substitute proceedings based on the 
breakdown of the relationship for 
those based on fault or vice-versa. 
 Regarding the consequences of 
divorce, the 1975 Act did not live up 
to its promises. The major objective 
of the 1975 Act was to force the 
parties to agree on a divorce 
settlement by the time the divorce 
decree was granted. In this respect, 
the principle was that the payment of 
prestations compensatoires (financial 
relief) would take place in the form 
of a single capital sum payment. 
However, a difficult financial 
situation experienced by a majority of 
couples – either they do not have such 
capital sum or the capital sum is too 
small – means that this form of 
payment is rarely effective and that 
prestations compensatoires have to be 
paid by way of a rente mensuelle 
(monthly allowance) or viagère (life 
annuity). Furthermore, under the 1975 
Act, prestations compensatoires could 
not be reviewed at a later stage, even 
in the case of sudden change in the 
financial circumstances of the parties 
(except where a lack of review would 
have dire consequences for one of the 
parties). It was not until the Act of 
30 June 2000 on financial relief that 
such review was made possible. 
Finally, under the 1975 Act, the 
decision on financial relief had to be 
made before liquidation du régime 
matrimonial (the settlement of 
accounts between spouses) which can 
usually be completed after the divorce 
decree has been granted (for a 
complete and detailed critical 
analysis, see Gélard’s report, op cit, 
at pp 21-27). 
 Regarding children, it is self-
evident that any decision on parental 
authority or responsibility, support 
and contact cannot be made 
irrevocable. For that purpose, the 
1975 Act was amended by the Acts of 22 
July 1987, 8 January 1993 and 4 March 
2002 as a result of the evolution of 
child law towards parental 
responsibility and equality. The 1987 
Act replaced the concept of child 
‘custody’ by that of ‘parental 
authority’. It allowed it to be  
exercised jointly by both divorced 
parents (See M.-F. Nicolas-Maguin, 
Pouvoirs du juge et Volonté des 
Parents dans l’Exercise en Commun de 
l’Autorité Parentale Prévu par la Loi 
du 22 juillet 1987 (1988) Dalloz, 
Chron at p 307)). The Act of 1993 laid 
down the principle of joint parental 
authority after the divorce (See 
H. Fulchiron, Une Nouvelle Réforme de 
l’Autorité Parentale. Commentaire de 
la Loi no 93-22 du 8 janvier 1993 à la 
Lumière de l’Application de la loi 
‘Malhuret’ (1993) Dalloz, Chron at 
p 117). The 2002 Act (nr 2003-305) 
gives parents the freedom to make any 
agreement on the exercise of parental 
authority and have it validated in 
court. The courts have an obligation 
to validate such agreement so long as 
they are satisfied that the interests 
of the child(ren) are sufficiently 
protected and that the parents have 
freely entered into this agreement. 
The separation of the parents does not 
affect the rules on the transfer of 
parental authority. 
 
 Like many reforms, that of 1975 
raised a number of hopes that would 
inevitably lead to disappointments. 
Despite having made a number of 
necessary improvements in the regime 
of divorce, the overall assessment of 
the 1975 Act can only be a mixed one. 
Over twenty-five years of 
implementation revealed a number of 
important weaknesses. There has been 
therefore a general consensus among 
legal academics and practitioners upon 
the need for a new reform (see, 
notably, P. Courbe, Droit de la 
famille (2nd edn, Armand Colin, 2001), 
at p 119, para 260; A. Bénabent, op 
cit, at p 137, para 230. See also 
J. Rozier’s report, op cit; P. 
Gélard’s report, op cit; G. Levy, 
Information Report on Divorce Bill nr 
1338 as adopted by the Senate, 
National Assembly Parliamentary 
Session 2003-2004, Report nr 1486, 
available at http://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/ 
12/rap-info/i1486.asp; and P. 
Delnatte’s report, op cit). 
The reform under the Act of 26 May 
2004 
The Divorce Bill nr 389 was first 
tabled before the Senate, the upper 
chamber of the French Parliament 
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during its 2002-2003 session. Two 
years earlier, a Private Bill (Private 
Bill nr 3189 (2000-2001) of 26 June 
2001. See P. Gélard, Report nr 252 
(2001-2002)) tabled by F. Colcombet MP 
(Socialist Group) went through a first 
reading in the National Assembly, the 
lower chamber, on 10 October 2001 and 
in the Senate on 21 February 2002. 
This Bill aimed to abolish fault as a 
ground for divorce and to allow 
divorce within the first year of 
marriage – even against the will of 
one of the spouses – thus abolishing 
the necessary 6-year separation 
period. It also proposed to abolish 
certain specific consequences inherent 
to divorce granted on the ground of 
the exclusive liability of one of the 
spouses (torts exclusifs) or to 
divorce following the breakdown of the 
relationship. This Bill was 
substantially amended by the Senate 
which was not prepared to abolish 
fault as a ground for divorce. 
 In October 2001, another Private 
Bill was also tabled before the Senate 
by Senator N. About (Private Bill nr 
12 (2002–2002)), the objective of 
which was to substitute divorce on 
objective grounds (divorce pour cause 
objective) for divorce based on fault. 
Both bills were made redundant 
following the re-election of President 
Chirac and the subsequent change of 
government and parliamentary majority 
in June 2002. In October 2002, Mr 
Christian Jacob, the Minister in 
charge of Family Affairs, announced a 
new reform of divorce law based on the 
Senate’s preparatory works. 
 The Divorce Bill number 389 was 
designed as the first step of a much 
wider reform of family law. Following 
the emergency procedure, this Bill 
became the Act nr 2004-439 relating to 
divorce on 26 May 2004 (published in 
the Official Journal of the French 
Republic nr 122 of 27 May 2004, at 
p 9319). The new Act will come into 
force on 1 January 2005. 
 
General considerations 
One of the most striking 
characteristics of the Divorce Bill 
was how well it was received by both 
Houses of Parliament on the one hand 
and by academics and practitioners on 
the other. It was perceived globally 
as a ‘balanced, well thought-out’ Bill 
(see Gélard’s report, op cit, at 
p 33), which brought about a pacifying 
reform, respectful of the institution 
of marriage (see Delnatte’s report, op 
cit, at p 15). Such consensus (see 
Rozier’s report, op cit, at p 23) over 
a new draft piece of legislation is 
usually exceptional, especially in an 
area such as family law. However, this 
is not too surprising as the Bill was 
the product of a well orchestrated and 
fruitful collaboration between the 
legislator and legal academics and 
practitioners (in December 2002, the 
Minister of Justice and the Minister 
in charge of Family Affairs called 
upon the setting-up of a working 
group, bringing together 22 MPs,  
academics and practitioners, with the 
view to drawing up together the bases 
of this reform). 
 
The content of the reform 
Compared to other European legislation 
on divorce, French law, which 
recognises four grounds for divorce, 
could be regarded as one of the most 
complex within the EU. However, the 
new Act of 2004 creates an innovative 
architecture for the grounds for 
divorce, instigates greater relaxation 
of divorce procedures and 
substantially re-thinks the 
consequences of divorce. It is 
primarily concerned with rationalising 
the various divorce routes and 
procedures, notably by setting up an 
initial common procedure as well as 
pathways between them.  
  
The grounds for divorce 
Article 1 (new art 29 of the Civil 
Code) of the Act preserves one of the 
peculiarities of French law: plurality 
of grounds for divorce. There still 
are four grounds couples may choose 
from: mutual consent; acceptation du 
principe de la rupture du marriage or 
divorce accepté (acceptance of the 
breakdown of marriage); altération 
définitive du lien conjugal (permanent 
alteration of married life) and fault. 
 Against the proposals put forward by 
Colcombet and About in 2001, both 
Houses of Parliament chose not to 
abolish fault as a cause of divorce as 
it was felt that this would be out of 
line with the conception and 
perception of divorce in the French 
society. The decision to keep this 
ground is generally perceived as being 
in coherence with the duties and 
obligations of marriage (See 
Delnatte’s report, op cit, at pp 13-
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14; see also F. Dekeuwer-Défossez, 
op.cit., at pp 85 and I. Théry, op 
cit, at pp 113–115). However, 
art 5(II) of the 2004 Act limits its 
scope of application to the most 
serious cases of breach of duties and 
obligations of married life rendering 
it intolerable, in particular cases of 
domestic violence. Also its article 23 
abolishes article 243 of the Civil 
Code, which allowed one of the spouses 
to petition for divorce on the ground 
that the other was found guilty of a 
criminal offence.  
 Divorce by mutual consent is 
simplified under art 2 (amending arts 
230 and 232 of the Civil Code) of the 
new Act: when the spouses agree on the 
principle of their separation and on 
the consequences of it, they can 
petition the court by joint request to 
which a separation agreement 
consolidating their divorce settlement 
will be attached. Following a single 
hearing (instead of two originally), 
the agreement is to be ratified in 
court provided the court is satisfied 
that the spouses have given their free 
consent and that the agreement 
protects effectively and in a balanced 
way the interests of each spouse and 
those of the children (see new 
art 232). 
 The second form of divorce by mutual 
consent under the 1975 Act, ie by 
unilateral request as accepted by the 
respondent is replaced by a new 
ground: acceptance of the breakdown of 
marriage, also referred to as divorce-
résignation (divorce by resignation). 
Under art 3 (amending art 233 and 234 
of the Civil Code), divorce can be 
requested by one of the spouses or 
both and will be granted on the basis 
that they both have accepted that 
their relationship has irretrievably 
broken down, irrespective of the facts 
that made their married life 
intolerable. 
 Finally, the main innovation under 
this Act is the substitution of the 
ground of altération definitive du 
lien conjugal for that of rupture de 
vie commune (see Art 4 which amends 
arts 237 and 238 of the Civil Code). 
Under new art 238 of the Civil Code, 
divorce can be granted on the ground 
that the parties to the marriage have 
lived apart for a continuous period of 
at last 2 years immediately preceding 
the presentation of the petition or 
occurring between the court order 
recognising the failure of 
conciliation and the presentation of 
petition (the deterioration of the 
mental health of the respondent is no 
longer a cause of divorce under new 
art 238 as was the case under rupture 
de vie commune; see above at p 3). The 
former requirement of 6 years of 
separation prior to divorce 
proceedings has therefore been 
abandoned. A new article 246 of the 
Civil Code also provides that, where 
both spouses have filed a divorce 
petition concurrently, one based on 
fault and the other on the ground of 
permanent alteration of married life, 
the court may grant a divorce decree 
on the latter ground after dismissing 
the petition based on fault. In this 
case, indeed, the court can only come 
to the obvious conclusion that the 
marriage has irretrievably been 
altered as both spouses have requested 
its termination.  
The procedure 
Although procedural provisions will be 
further specified by implementing 
regulations, the 2004 Act lays down 
the main guidelines. 
 Procedure is considerably simplified 
and made flexible enough to allow for 
any subsequent change in the parties’ 
petitions. In order to keep open the 
avenues of conciliation, arts 10 
(amending art 251 of the Civil Code) 
and 13 (amending art 257 of the Civil 
Code) have set up a common initial 
procedure for divorce contentieux 
(divorce other than by mutual consent) 
whereby the grounds for divorce need 
not be specified in the original 
application for divorce. It is only 
after conciliation has failed that the 
parties may decide on which ground 
they wish to present their petition. 
 Article 7 (amending art 247 of the 
Civil Code) also creates pathways 
between the four procedures available, 
thus enabling the parties to 
reconsider their course of action at 
any stage in the divorce proceedings. 
The parties may request, at any time 
in the proceedings, that, should they 
reach an agreement, a divorce by 
mutual consent be granted by the court 
(art 247). Equally, they can request 
from the court a divorce decree on the 
ground of acceptance of the marriage 
breakdown even if the proceedings were 
initiated on the ground of fault or 
permanent alteration of married life 
(art 247-1). Finally, in proceedings 
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based on permanent alteration of 
married life and where the respondent 
has presented a petition based on 
fault, the original petition may be 
modified to take account of the 
respondent’s faults (art 247-2). 
 Furthermore, the Act encourages the 
parties to reach, at any time in the 
proceedings, full or partial 
settlement, which can then be ratified 
in court (see arts 11 (amending 
art 252-3 of the Civil code) and 17 
(amending art 268 of the Civil Code)). 
The consequences 
With respect to the consequences of 
divorce, the 2004 reform is 
articulated around three principles. 
First, the relaxation and the 
improvement of the regime of 
prestations compensatoires as amended 
by the Act of 30 June 2000: prestation 
compensatoire is now the sole form of 
financial relief as the duty for one 
party to support financially the other 
(devoir de secours) in the form of a 
monthly reviewable pension alimentaire 
(maintenance) is abolished under 
art 23 (repealing arts 282–285 of the 
Civil Code on devoir de secours after 
the divorce). Prestation compensatoire 
is calculated according to better 
defined criteria. In particular, it 
can take a variety of forms to adjust 
to the variety of estates by allowing 
the combination of various capital sum 
payments, or of a capital sum payment 
with an allowance (rente). If the 
principle of a capital sum payment 
remains, the 2004 Act gives the 
parties the freedom to decide how the 
prestation compensatoire should be 
paid. 
 Secondly, the protection of the 
weakest party: besides the usual 
financial relief granted to the 
economically weakest party, specific 
financial compensation can be granted 
in special cases. For instance, art 17 
(amending art 266 of the Civil code) 
provides that dommages et interêts 
(compensation) can be awarded to the 
party who faces exceptionally grave 
consequences, either in the case of a 
divorce granted against that party on 
the ground of permanent alteration of 
married life or of the divorce being 
granted on the ground of torts 
exclusifs (exclusive fault) of that 
party’s spouse. Also, art 22 (amending 
art 220-1 of the Civil Code) gives 
powers to the court to evict a violent 
spouse from the family home by 
ordering résidence séparée before a 
divorce petition is filed if that 
spouse represents a serious threat to 
the other spouse or the children. 
However, such interim measure becomes 
lapsed if no divorce petition or 
application for judicial separation is 
made within 3 months. This provision 
aims to protect the victim who, 
generally, is the one who is forced to 
leave the family home.  
 Thirdly, a full and swift divorce 
settlement: with the view to avoiding 
the occurrence of a settlement of 
accounts as between spouses after the 
divorce decree has been granted – 
which can lead to further and lengthy 
litigation – the objective of the 2004 
Act is to encourage the parties to 
prepare the basis for a settlement at 
as early a stage as possible. To that 
end, the court can take a number of 
interim measures, notably to appoint a 
notary to draft a settlement agreement 
(art 12 amending art 255 of the Civil 
Code). Also, art 13 of the Act 
provides that, unless the divorce 
petition contains a draft settlement 
for all pecuniary and property 
interests, it will be deemed 
inadmissible. If no settlement is 
agreed before the divorce decree is 
granted, the court can order it to be 
completed within strict time-limits 
(art 17 amending art 267 of the Civil 
Code). 
 
General assessment 
It is arguable that the 2004 Act can 
be presented as a significant overhaul 
of the French regime of divorce in a 
generation. It is without any doubt a 
balanced and well thought-out reform, 
which has the merit of modernising and 
simplifying divorce proceedings, 
making them more flexible and adapting 
them to the changes of the French 
society, while re-affirming and 
respecting the value of marriage. The 
Act enshrines the principle of a 
complete freedom to divorce by 
substantially reforming divorce 
following the breakdown of the 
relationship and replacing it with 
divorce for altération définitive du 
lien conjugal following a 2-year 
separation. In stark contrast with the 
situation under the 1975 Act, where 
this ground was marginally used, the 
new provision should definitively have 
the effect of encouraging divorce 
petitions on this ground, all the more 
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so since, unlike in English law, 
consent of the other spouse is not 
necessary. 
 Under a simplified divorce process – 
one single hearing for divorce by 
mutual consent; one core procedure for 
other forms of divorce and the 
emphasis on conciliation – and with 
the possibility of modifying the 
ground for divorce at any time in the 
proceedings, the parties will be less 
pressurised and will be more inclined 
to negotiate and reach an agreement at 
an early stage.  
 However, with respect to the 
grounds, it is regrettable that the 
law-makers have not taken this 
opportunity to replace fault with an 
objective cause for divorce. It does 
not seem to make great sense to 
preserve this ground and, at the same 
time, to limit its impact by either 
limiting its scope of application to 
what could amount to unreasonable 
behaviour or by offering alternative 
routes. 
 All in all, the secret of the success 
of this reform clearly lies with its 
meticulous preparation before it was 
debated in Parliament and notably with 
the wide consultation process it 
underwent. It is certainly more likely 
to live up to its promises than the 
1975 Act. 
 
